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GERMANY'S SATELLITE POLICY DEBATE: ITS 
RELEVANCE TO EUROPE AND CANADA 
Gertrude Joch Robinson 
(McCill University) 
"New Media" debates in Germany are used to pinpoint the issues and identify 
the players involved in the power struggle. 
L'auteur s'appuie sur les dbbats allemands sur les nouveaux m6dias afin de 
cerner les problbmes et de rep6rer luttes de pouvoir. 
Americans tend to say that the market must be relied on because no government 
can presume to decide what is in the best interests of the variegated public. But 
Europeans rejoin that they have pinned their faith on the possibility of getting a bet- 
ter wisdom than that of the marketplace. (Homet, 1979:98) 
Introduction 
The coming of cable and satellite television in the climate of U.S. deregulation 
have accelerated the world-wide debate about media policy. Until recently, European 
countries enjoyed some form of communications sovereignty. In Canada, in contrast, 
communications sovereignty has by now been under U.S. pressure for more than sixty 
years, and might therefore offer European policy makers a "forward look useful to 
their own future planning. Yet, the exact issues involved in new media regulation are 
difficult to pinpoint for Canadian policy makers (witness the DOC'S 1987 discussion 
paper Television for the 21. Century) and for their European counterparts. If one as- 
sumes that technological changes alone triggered these debates, it seems reasonable 
to expect that there will be great similarities in the ways in which "new" media issues 
are defined on both sides of the Atlantic. If, instead social analysts are right, those 
who have argued that new media technologies are implemented in aparticular socio- 
political context, then the issues selected for debate and solutions proposed in Europe 
might be radically different (Robinson, 1985). European interpretations of the tech- 
nological future and the nature of "deregulation" might be assessed in a manner ir- 
relevant to the Canadian context. 
To explore this problem in greater detail the paper follows a thm-part strategy. 
It begins by laying out a conceptual framework for the study of power in society and 
how this is related to media policy making. It then uses the German satellite policy 
debate as a case study for pinpointing how contending actors conceptualize the major 
issues in this debate. The third section places these issues into a wider European con- 
text and reflects on the relevance of European media policy interpretations for the 
Canadian situation. 
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The Actors in a 'Ikansnational Context 
The introduction of cable and satellite technologies in Europe has intensifiedpres- 
es and demands for both regulation and coordination of the flow of program con- 
t across national borders. Though there has always been some spillover from 
cstrial broadcasting transmitters, the scale of the phenomenon was previously too 
all to cause concern. Consequently, up to the seventies it was assumed that each 
ional state could operate its broadcasting system according to its own cultural mores 
1 political goals. The "gates" of these national electronic systems were formerly 
 trolled by a small number of institutionalized actors who dealt with problems of 
css, policy formation, and property rights of artists, writers and performers. The 
nination of channel scarcity and the multiple actors wishing to exploit the new 
dia technologies, have now drastically changed this policy environment. Power- 
private groups are searching for access to profitable fields of electronic operation 
ile governments have woken up to the national economic benefits which may be 
ived from international television and data flow. 
The Euromedia Research Group views policy-making as a reaction to a challenge, 
:action that is intended to strike a reasonable balance between the 'forces of change' 
1 the 'forces of preservation' (McQuail/Sinue,l986: 15). In the European situation 
h its varied national constituencies the question whether a European media policy 
~ i n g  forged thus becomes one of trying to determine whether policy initiatives can 
ter be explained by reference to national traditions, or by reference to the goals of 
ticular interest groups. To assess the viability of these alternative hypotheses Den- 
McQuail and Karen Sinue et al. argue a political power framework is a useful 
~lytic tool. It interlinks four parameters: actors, issues, interests and control and 
1s permits systematic analysis of issues and comparison of actors. In such a 
mework a guiding rationale for the actor is expected to be his or her ability to max- 
ize power. Actors' interests in turn are said to consist of the consequences of dif- 
ent outcomes for the fulfillment of expressed wishes. Wishes, goals and the 
miated interests are thus elements in what can be termed the 'logic' of the actor 
186: 16). 
New electronic media transmission technologies have attracted a growing num- 
o f  actors who were not previously involved with broadcasting issues. Several dif- 
ent groups can be distinguished on the transnational and national levels. On the 
nsnational level they include the electronics industries, both hardware and software, 
ich are in favor of technological development per se. In some European countries 
se industries economic arguments are supported by their governments. In others, 
qernment elites try to balance their special needs against those of society as a whole. 
Ice the seventies they are joined by political organizations like the EEC and the 
uncil of Europe involved with the development of technical know-how, European 
~gration and cultural self-sufficiency. A third group of transnational players are 
~perative public broadcasting associations like the Empean Broadcasting Union 
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(EBU) and regulatory associations concerned with aemspace technology and stand- 
ardization. 
Actors on the national political level include state and federal governments as 
well as parliaments, which might have initiated electronic developments for political 
purposes or are expected to take initiatives as new technologies become available. 
Their arguments for action are: the positive impact of new media on the balance of 
trade and employment and the possible development and acceptance of business com- 
munication. They are joined by various ministries such as post and telegraph 0, 
with responsibility for the technical side of network creation and maintenance, and 
those of culture and industry, which often follow goals contradictory to the P'IT's. 
Finally there are the national public broadcasting services which are specifically 
charged with the production of electronic programming and have had a monopoly on 
its distribution. Various boards, labor and citizens groups and commercial program 
producers complete this group of national players. They are generally interested in 
decentralizing federal media policy and fight for the establishment of local and 
regional stations to provide more entertainment programming. 
Dennis McQuail concludes that though the television "receiver" within the home 
opens up opportunities for large scale personal computer ownership, cinema-at-home 
opportunities (through VCR), as well as search and data base access, European policy 
makers and the general public on the continent continue to view television primarily 
as a ready source of entertainment and information for large audiences. All regulatory 
actors are therefore preoccupied with the "political" control dimensions of television 
expansion, while potentially revolutionary changes in relation to telematics are being 
made by administrative act without much public discussion (McQuail, 1986b: 125). 
The German satellite debates since the seventies reflect not only this bias, but provide 
a means for identifying the different actors in the policy making situation and the ways 
in which they define the "crucial issues" concerning the "new media". Their issue 
determination will then be compared with Canadian concerns, to determine whether 
European thinking provides relevant guidelines for our own situation. 
New Media Policy Planning in the Federal Republic of Germany 
European satellite policy has been difficult to foresee and plan because advan- 
ces in transmission and reception technologies challenge a number of earlier actor 
agreements and will have profound effects on several media policy issues at once. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany the first set of debates involved three major groups 
of players: the military, the ministry of post and telegraph 0 and the electronics 
industry. They are still engaged in negotiating the parameters and making choices 
about which new technologies will be innovated and in what order. These decisions 
were of course not made in a vacuum, but were influenced as well by other transna- 
tional players. 
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ellite policy planning in Germany commenced in the early seventies under 
Schmidt's Social Democrats. It was fueled by the European space agency's 
*-SAT program (now Olympus) designed to create space exploration and rock- 
:hing capacities competitive with those available in the United States. These 
ellite capacities were initially planned for military purposes, not for the dis- 
n of TV programs. In 1977 pan-European planning was however intermped 
Vorld Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) which approved the assign- 
geodesic satellite positions on a national basis. The German government took 
ortunity to unite with France and to create a bilateral direct broadcast satellite 
~lan. It was designed to control satellite programming from elsewhere and to 
~usiness opportunities for the two countries' electronics industries (Luyken, 
5). 
th the Pl'T and the electronics industry supported this plan. The Pl'T because 
I obviate expensive cable network installation and Siemens, Standard Elektrik 
(an ITT subsidiary) and Detewe Philips because they would develop the satel- 
receiving antennas (Dewandre, 1986: 139). The system was initially to con- 
-3 DBS satellites as well as leased telecommunication capacities. Orbiting of 
nan/French sponsored TV-SamF-1 was slated for 1985 (Roemer, 1984:47), 
le hybrid Kopernikus, with its 34 ground stations was to become operative in 
lueller-Roemcr, 1985:540). Such a setup, as Table 1 indicates, would provide 
I viewers with direct access to 9 DBS channels via TV-SaUDF-1, plus another 
:ommunications channels on the Kopernikus system or by lease on the 
m communication satellite systems, Intelsat-V and Eutelsat. 
: DBS portion of the project is however now in some confusion because com- 
television interests can get transponder leases more cheaply on the ECS satel- 
on such planned and privately financed satellite ventures as Astra, set up by 
iete Europeeme des Satellites (SES) in Luxembourg. As a result the TV- 
7-1 satellites are at least two years in arrears and only partially launched. In 
vening period the costs for Kopernikus financed by the German PTT have 
dated so much that this launch is delayed as well. Two other factors are un- 
ng the viability of the original decision in favor of direct broadcast satellite 
ision over cable distribution. They are audience confusion over whether DBS 
]ally provide more program choice than presently available and resistance to 
xeiver equipment investment for the reception of DBS carried signals. At 
nost urban cable viewers already receive two national public service programs 
id ZDF) plus SAT- 1 and RTL-plus ceproduced with commercial sponsors, as 
four European programs: Super Channel and Sky Channel (English), TV 5 
1, and KMP Music Box. All of these can presently be received without fancy 
a1 equipment because the satellite distributed (Intelsat V) programs are 
directly to large cable head antennas and re-distributed over terrestial frequen- 
.ect broadcast satellite (DBS) distributed programs, in contrast, will require 
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the purchase of a costly parabolic antenna with contacts for about $2.400-3.000 or a 
new television receiver with a D2-MAC decoder for $2,800 (Roeper, 1987x35). 
In the light of the need to amortize the heavy investment costs in DBS satellites, 
which amount to about $1.1 to $2.9 million per satellite, the P'TT is now rethinking its 
original distribution decision favoring DBS satellite over cable distribution for TV 
programming. What seems to be emerging is a tripartite distribution system plan 
centered on cable, at least for the foreseeable future. This shift is heralded by a rapid 
projected increase in FlT cable laying activity between 1987-1990. In this period the 
number of cabled German TV households is to more than double from 8% to 18% 
(Luyken, 1987: 625-7). Increased numbers of cabled household, the FlT hopes will 
in turn attract commercial sponsors to invest money in new programs and thus guaran- 
tee that network investment and rental costs will be slowly amortized. 
In this complex environment the survival and commercial future of DBS trans- 
mission systems, which are much more expensive to install will depend on a variety 
of factors. Among these are: their reliability once in orbit, which is now expected to 
be seven to nine years (see Table 1). In addition there is the question whether German 
commercial programmers will beam their new program offerings over DBS channels 
which cover the national temtory, or choose conventional satellites which can reach 
a European audience (Roeper,1987a:39). The much higher program transmission 
costs, Luyken believes, may possibly be outweighed by the technical improvements 
offered through DBS transmission. These include D2-MAC standards which offer a 
new quality of reception, high definition television (HDTV) and cheaper digital radio 
transmission than is possible on conventional satellite systems (Luyken,1987:620- 
1 ;628-9). 
In the process of redefining satellite transmission policies German industrial ac- 
tors have benefited from public funds and German viewers have received more 
program variety than initially available over the two public networks of ARD and 
ZDF. The new media debate has also offered private media producers a wedge for 
furthering their interests through viewer demand for more entertainment f m .  
The Debate over Private Participation 
Until recently the German broadcasting situation was similar to that of France. 
Programs were produced by nine independent and public organizations of the Laender 
and fed into two channels, ARD national and ARD regional, not unlike the British ITV 
model. To this was added a second national channel (ZDF') in 1959 to provide more 
program variety. Both public channels derive only a small portion of their operating 
budget from commercials: 20% in the case of the ARD and 40% for ZDF. Both also 
present not more than 20 minutes of "block advertising per day (McQuailISinue, 
1986: 160). 
TABLE 1 
DEPLOYMENT PLANS FOR TV-TRANSMISSION SATELLI TES IN EUROPE UNTIL 1990 
Satellite No Year User Life 
Country Transpoden Organizer Launch Organizations Status in Years 
PPS - Satellites 
Intelsat V (UK) (FRG) 
Eutelsat F-1 (EU) 
Eutelsat F-2 (EU) 
Telecom 1 B/C (FR) 
Direct Broadcast Satellites 
TV-SAT 1 (FRG) 
TV-SAT 2 (FRG) 
TDF-1 (F) 
TDF-2 (F) 
TELEX-X (WE) 
BSB (UK) 
Hybrid Satellites 
Astra (LUX) 
Olympus (EU) 
SARIT-1 (SP) 
Kopernikus (FRG) 
Intelsat 
Eutelsat 
Eutelsat 
DGTIFrance 
m 
m 
Teledif de 
France (TDF) 
Teledif de 
France (TDF) 
NOTELSAT 
Brit. Sat. Br. 
Soc. Europ. 
des Satellites (SES) 
. . 
Eu Space. Ag. 
(ESA) 
Telespacio 
P?T (DBP) 
1964 
1983 
1989190 
1985 
Nov. 87 
Oct. 89 
Apr. 88? 
Jan. 90 
Nov. 88 
Aug. 89 
Sept. 88 
July 89 
1990199 
Feb. 89 
1990 
SVT/YLE/NRK 
IBA 
operat. 
operat. 
contract 
operat. 
operat.? 
contract 
operat? 
contract 
in prod. 
contract 
private? in prod. 
RAI-UnolEBU in prod. 
Rai-Uno planned 
FRG ? in prod. 
? contract Atlantic (IRE) 
SAT Iri& vartn. 
Source: Luyken, Media Perspektiven 10187,616 
"?" final user organization not yet determined. 
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The climate of opinion concerning commercial involvement in broadcasting was 
initially unfavorable in most European countries. Yet, after the election of more right 
leaning governments in some of the larger European countries, this has changed. In 
Germany the Christian Democratic "pragmatists" under Mr. Kohl believe a degree of 
commercialism is necessary if new media potential is to be fully exploited. This 
change in outlook is reflected as well in Eutelsat, a transnational organization made 
up of national P'IT's. In a most important yet undebated policy decision this organiza- 
tion decided in 1982 to allow commercial television on to F'IT-owned satellites in 
order to recoup some of the heavy investment costs incurred in all countries. 
In Germany the changed climate accelerated the formation of multi-media con- 
glomerates to provide scarce funds for programming in competition with the public 
broadcasters. Five major groups of print and film interests are presently trying to posi- 
tion themselves to benefit from Germany's electronic future. In private television 
production the two surviving front runners since 1986 are the SAT-1 and RTL-plus 
consortia which underwrite and produce the programming for the two new private 
channels of the same name. Their competition is fierce, though SAT-1 presently has 
only a small lead over its rival. In 1986 it reached 12% of cabled households as against 
RTl-plus' 10% (Roeper, 1987:495). Four big cable and print groups hold 85% of SAT- 
1's shares. They are Programmges. Kabel & Satellitenrundfunk (PKS) (40%). Axel 
Springer Verlag (15%). Holtzbrinck Gruppe (15%) and Aktuell Presse-Fernsehen 
(15%) which is a group of 165 newspapers producing news, quizz and film programs 
(Roeper, 1987:483). Leo Kirch, Europe's largest film mogul is represented through 
the PKS group. 
RTL-plus in contrast is a conglomerate in which 46% of the stock is held by the 
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion (CLT) and 39% by Ufa (a German film 
producer). Print interests take a back seat here with Westdeutsche Allgemeine (WAZ) 
holding 10% of shares, Burda 2% and the Frankfurter Allgemeine 1% (Roeper, 
1987:489). The shifting business interests which have shaped and reshaped these two 
conglomerates in the past three years, reflect the market uncertainties facing private 
programmers in Germany. In spite of this three other conglomerates are also deeply 
involved in both the television and radio program fields. Their sub-companies are bid- 
ding for the terrestial frequencies which are now being awarded by the Laender 
governments for regional and local programming. They are the Bertelsman AG with 
huge holdings in book and magazine publishing , the Holtzbrinck group with press 
holdings and Burda composed of magazine interests. All of them are competing for 
possible local and regional program projects which will be offered over at least two 
new private channels in each Land (province). Cross-ownership issues raised by this 
development have up to the present remained unresolved or more frequently yielded 
to the political party political pressures emanating from the Landesgovernment 
(Roeper, 1987a:38). 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 13, NO. 3&4 35 
C 
caster 
tween 
of the 
World 
ing SI 
Mean 
side r 
m u  
tional 
privat 
cems 
Togetl 
al "mi 
sport ; 
T 
Germ; 
blocs 
Prow 
the pu 
have 1 
ownin 
Rhein 
Aside 
debatc 
(dereg 
R 
, despitc 
creata 
Intelsa 
toDBI 
of ten 
PUS-'] 
Germa 
ming r 
cially j 
dream 
Sky C1 
lion EI 
, tion (I. 
lompetition has also heated up on the international scene where the public broad- 
s had an advantage during the phase of satellite program experimentation be- 
1983-1986. During this time both ARD and ZDF tested the export capability 
ir programming to European audiences through their nightly "Window on the 
I" and "Europe Program." They also lightened their own schedule by develop- 
uch now popular series as "Schwarzwald Klinik and "Lindenstrasse." 
while the Bertelsman,Springer and Kirch conglomerates were also looking out- 
~ational borders and connected up with the Premier group of Britain which 
ces a pay-TV program "Teleclub. Other conglomerates sought other interna- 
partners to enter the European market. When the German high court declared 
e participation on the direct broadcast satellite TV-Sat legal in 1986, these con- 
were well positioned to join forces with the public service organizations. 
her public and private broadcast institutions are now co-producing two addition- 
xed" channels, "3 SAT (ZDF) and "Eins Plus", which are designed to offer more 
and entertainment programming. 
his move has generated wide debate about the "doppel Monopol" developing in 
an broadcasting. What is at stake here is the division of audiences into regional 
in which newspaper interests together with the public broadcasters will control 
un availability. These regional coalitions are already forming in the north where 
~blic broadcasters of Niedersachsen, Schleswig-Holstein, Berlin and Hamburg 
Egun to prepare joint programs with newspaper and publishing conglomerates 
~g cable companies and in the south where Baden-Wuertemberg, Bayem and 
land-Pfalz are interlinked with the Holtzbrinck group (Roeper, 1987:493). 
from the central matter of breaching the public broadcast monopoly, no public 
: in Germany has considered lifting restrictions on commercial activities 
plation) or raised the issue of the profitability of TV-receiver related services. 
European Commerical Television Development 
ecent research has shown that television alone is a growth industry in Europe, 
e the availability of other new media. Since 1984 ten new programs have been 
d and at least a dozen more are on the way. They are presently distributed over 
a or Eutelsat channels, but some of German programs are ultimately to be shifted 
S. Table 2 indicates that most of these operate in the evenings only and nine out 
are heavily entertainment oriented. Among these is the pan-European OLYM- 
'V program funded by five of Europe's public service broadcasters, including 
my's ARD. It was started in October 1985 and carries four hours of program- 
lightly to Western European cable TV operators. Selected German cities, espe- 
in the south-west already receive most of these services by cable. However, the 
of Empean network television remains a long way off. Even Rupert Murdoch's 
hannel which distributes music and entertainment shows via satellite to 10 mil- 
 ropea an households has lost about $44 million in the five years since its incep- 
,uyken, 1987:624). 
TABLE 2 
AVAILABLE EUROPEAN SATELLITE PROGRAMS 
(VIA INTELSAT OR EUTELSAT) 
Channel Program Schedule PB S/COMM Originator Advertising Program Type 
1 "RAI I" 12-24h PBS RAI Yes Entertm. Y I 
2 "3 SAT 18-24h PBS 
3 "Olympus" 18-24h PBS 
4 'TV V" 19 - 23 h PBS 
In 
ZDF/ORF/SRG no Full Prog. cn C 
ARDINOSIRAVRTE/RTP Y-  EX^^^^. e g 
TFl/A2/FR3/RTB/SSR no Entertm. 
6 "Sky Channel" 14.30 - 00.30 h COMM Satellite Television London Yes Entertm. 4 
7 'Teleclub" 19-24h COMM Teleclub AG no Film 
9 
PAY TV Zrich K 
8 "RTL-Plus" 17-24h COMM CLT Luxemburg Yes Entertm 8 P 
9 "FilrnNet" 17-01 h COMM Pay TV F i e t M o l l a n d  no Film 9 0 
10 "SAT 1" 13.30 - 24.00 h COMM SAT 1 Konsortium Yes Entertm. 5 o
b 7 
11 "Music-Box" 08-02h COMM Thorn EM 1 Yes Video-Clips 
12 "Eins Plus" 18-24h MIXED ARD/Konsortium Yes Entertm. 
Source: Mueller-Romer, 1985: 546 
Luykens, 1987: 623 
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Iuropean network television is stymied by three fundamental issues which remain 
olved. They include consumer willingness to pay for extra program choice; the 
er of new channels and programs sustainable by the national and the pan- 
m advertising markets; and the quality-ratings controversy, which turns on the 
enance of program variety. The consumer's willingness to pay for additional 
:es is confounded by technical and economic factors. Germany's lack of frequen- 
I the 87-108 MHz bands restrict private radio networks to two per Land, in ad- 
to the two public networks already in existence. Limited advertising markets, 
n will probably support no more than the two additional federation wide 
sion services SAT-1 and RTL-plus, at an estimated programming cost of 200 mill 
T (Starnmler, 1985:607). Whether their entertainment offerings will be worth the 
reception costs of $800-$1,000 a year is as yet unknown (Roeper, 1987:495). A 
wwide survey indicated that Europeans were willing to spend no more than five 
.s monthly for satellite carried entertainment services, with Amsterdam residents 
ling to pay more than fifty cents per month for the Dutch ECS-1 channel (Mad- 
1983:13-14). 
ince the costs and risks involved in providing more program choice are so high, 
any's attitude to private broadcast participation is both ambiguous and political- 
ermined. The F"IT, as previously demonstrated, welcomes greater private invol- 
nt in order to help offset its high DBS launch and channel rental investments, but 
npered by Laender jurisdiction over program content and the dearth of cable 
holds. German advertiser interest in turn is depressed because of the small num- 
'DBS cabled households and the high cost of channel rentals. Additional hurdles 
ting European advertiser sponsored network TV are the paucity of European ad- 
ing funds and competing technologies. 
n the German media market TV garners less than 20% of all advertising dollars, 
it receives one third in America. According to the Economist only a rise of 1% 
lP in advertising spending and diversion of these monies to television, would in- 
: these potential revenues (Economist, 1986:72). Yet competing technologies 
IS video recorders and converters are already reducing advertising effectiveness 
us make TV a less attractive medium for advertisers. Video recorders are now 
L of German and U.S. TV households. In the latter they have reduced network 
nces from 90% to 76% since 1980. The same goes for converters which have 
k advertising effectiveness in some U.S. markets by up to 30% (Carey, 1980:23). 
F these developments raise grave doubts about television's effectiveness as a 
bean medium, and its "motor" potential in increasing European viewing time 
. the daily average of 3.5 hours. Unless television viewing as a leisure activity 
greater favor,the era of program plenty may be aborted before it even begins. 
1 spite of these dire financial considerations, commercialization of the electronic 
I sector in Germany will move apace as it has in Britain, where another conser- 
:government is preoccupied with economic growth. Yet, these changes are likely 
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to come, as elsewhere, by way of additions to the existing system rather than as dras- 
tic changes. This means, as we have seen, that cabling paid for by the P'IT will be 
pushed more strongly in the future and DBS expansion will probably be slowed in 
favor of hybrid satellite development, which can feed their signals to cable owned an- 
tenna heads. To succeed however, these plans will require negotiations with transna- 
tional players, such as the EEC, the Council of Europe, the European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU) and the International Telegraph Union (ITU), all of whom have a stake 
in Europe's telematic competitiveness and broadcast future. 
The PublicIPrivate Broadcast Debate: 
Germany's Response to the EEC's "Green Book" 
A third issue emerging from the "new media" debate revolves around the role of 
public broadcasters in Europe's electronic future. It achieved prominence in June 1984 
when the EEC Commission's Green Book entitled Television Without Frontiers was 
published. This proposed creation of a unified European broadcast market large 
enough to compete with outsiders by eliminating competition between its twelve units 
and by guaranteeing equality of access irrespective of country or institution size. All 
of this was to be achieved by turning broadcasting into a "service" flowing freely 
across national borders. To make this connection, the document argued that broadcast- 
ing is nothing but "information transfer" and as such does not differ from other types 
of "services" which are freely exchanged under the EEC's Treaty of Rome. 
To achieve "freedom of movement" for television services across national bor- 
ders, member states were asked to do three things: to encourage reception of national 
channels from all member states; to coordinate national broadcasting institutions into 
a mixed model which would accommodate both public and private programmers; and 
finally, to harmonize technical standards and legal provisions governing the media. 
According to the Green Book, the four types of legal provisions most in need of har- 
monization were: advertising rules; protection of young people; the right to reply; and 
copyright laws (European Parliament, Doc. A2-75/85:25-30). 
The German federal and Laender govemments as well as the public broadcasters 
ARD and ZDF rejected these proposals on political as well as public service grounds. 
The federal government questioned its constitutional base, Laender governments saw 
it as interfering with their program powers and "public service" broadcasters felt it 
overlooked existing multinational arrangements. The German debate thus mirrors the 
unresolved nature of the struggle between public and private broadcast philosophies 
in most European countries. It also indicates that the Green Book's assumption of a 
uniform European cultural market is mistaken. European countries and audiences are 
in fact characterized by variety in languages, interests, socio-political structures, his- 
tories and media program conceptions, which together have created a diversified 
mosaic. It is widely believed that the Green Book proposals far from "opening up 
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iermany's federal government argued that the EEC's commercial Treaty of Rome 
rions were not applicable to broadcasting, because according to the 1981 
me Court decision, broadcasting in Germany is both a medium and a factor in 
: opinion formation (FRAG Entscheidung, BVerfGE Bd. 57,295 ff). Further- 
the treaty explicitly recognizes member state autonomy in the political and cul- 
d m s .  Under German broadcast law, consequently, programming must reflect 
inion "variety" of Germany's major social groups, and express "balance" by 
iting different points of view on public issues (Scharf, 1985a:149). 
aender governments in turn saw the EEC proposal as interfering with their 
mming powers by requiring "harmonization" in the areas of advertising and 
it quotas. The Laender governments noted that EEC states already support a set 
nilar rules concerning advertising restrictions on tobacco and alcoholic 
ages, pornography, violent material and false advertising. Yet, standards on ad- 
ing limits, composition (block or spot) and program interruption as well as Sun- 
ivertising were incapable of harmonization because they reflect differences in 
d ,  ethnic and religious outlooks. 
he ministers were additionally opposed to the Green Book's suggestion of a 
m, binding copyright law for all cable delivered television programming on the 
ds that it would abrogate bilateral agreements between broadcast organizations 
rning rebroadcast procedures (1279-66184 Stellungnahme der Laender zum 
~buch, 19855-6), and neglect distinctions between production classifications. 
television, video and music productions are presently compensated differently, 
se they constitute different types of intellectual property. Other member states 
I the forced licensing opposition and the European Parliament asked the EEC 
iission to reconsider the matter (Hillig, 1985593). 
.third contentious issue was the Green Book's call for European content quotas, 
50% for indigenous European TV programs and films. They were proposed to 
gthen Europe's television environment", in conjunction with the institution of a 
ly programmed multilingual European satellite television channel and a Com- 
y Fund to assist television and film ceproductions (Framework Regulation for 
)pan Media Policy, Doc. A2-75/85, sect.3-6:25-27). Though the European con- 
gulations would assure the sale and use of European programs, Germany's two 
networks (ARDlZDF) argued they were a politically dangerous precedent as 
s superfluous, because no more European programming than presently available 
be required to fill the newly proposed European channels. By treating mem- 
ite programming as though it were home produced, the European quota would 
omatically achieved (Gerth, 1985:604). 
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Gemany's two public broadcasters (ARD & ZDF) also cautioned against the in- 
ternational program implications of the EEC proposal. They, like other EBU members 
(40 public broadcasters in 3 1 countries), argued that a common market in broadcast- 
ing, regulated by economic criteria alone, was neither a protection against outside 
(U.S.) competition, nor an adequate framework for working out the publiclprivate 
programming issues facing contempomy Europe. Instead, European variety in cul- 
tural and broadcast heritages and the extensive voluntary arrangements already 
developed by public broadcasters in the EBU framework, should become the center- 
piece for future planning. 
Alfred Scharf, the EBU president, noted that many of the barriers which the Green 
Book proposals were supposed to remove had already been tackled by existing inter- 
national regulatory agencies. Among these were the ITU's spectrum allocation, the 
Geneva Convention's copyright activities and the EBU's program exchanges. The 21 
member ITU developed cooperative rules for the orbiting of DBS satellites which 
avoid spillover into adjacent territories. It also endorsed cross-national distribution of 
programming with prior consent from the receiving country and delegated ~k-making 
in cultural production to the nation state (Thiele, 1984734-35). The Geneva conven- 
tion developed international rules of "proper" compensation for intellectual property. 
These agreements have avoided the threat of very high first show royalties, which 
would have priced European programming out of its own market. Belgium, Sweden, 
Norway and the Netherlands furthermore took the lead in devising Europe-wide 
flexible copyright solutions, so that only the issue of retransmission rights remains to 
be negotiated (Scharf, l985a:7O- 1). 
The EBU finally tackled "spillover" effects, by working out bi- and multilateral 
cooperative program agreements, based on linguistic and cultural similarities. Three 
of these, the German, French, and Scandinavian regional agreements have already led 
to substantial production savings. Subsidized program exchanges furthermore were 
designed to protect weaker members, as do the thrice daily news exchanges, in which 
each nation reports the world from its own point of view (Scharf, 1985a:159). Thir- 
teen EBU rules codify advertising over satellite. These, according to Scharf, are con- 
siderably more detailed than those envisaged by the Green Book (Scharf, 1985a: 160). 
It is argued that all of these structures of cooperation would be undermined, if 
economic competition were to reign unchecked. Public broadcasters also warned that 
a fight for viewer quotas would not only increase European TV production costs by 
pitting "exclusivity" over replay rights, but would also ruin presently existing news 
exchanges which are important components in Europe's publicly sponsored network 
television (Scharf, 1985b367). 
The Relevance of German Media Policy Issues for Canada 
Our case study of Germany has suggested that while there are real challenges 
facing the existing electronic media order, the perceptions of the challenges and the 
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o them are generally clouded. McQuail and Sinue have noted that it is not 
at the different groups of actors do not know what they want, but that there 
I clear understanding of what is to be welcomed and what to be feared in 
:&a future (1986:197). A number of factors seem to add to this uncertain- 
them are the sheer number of players involved on the local, national and 
an levels, all of whom seem to foresee a different plot Added to this is the 
~f business actors who tend to identify technological novelty with social 
, This identification usually bears little resemblance to the actual 
t ratios when a technology is innovated. There is finally a tendency among 
ts to seek economic salvation in private industrial initiatives in the light of 
Ion that license fees and taxation are no longer viable alternatives for financ- 
dia. 
: of these uncertainties the contours of the new media problematic have be- 
a in the past fiteen years. One of the most important realizations is that 
wo quite separate developmental paths for the extension of television 
ng and for the development of telematics. Our case study suggests that the 
more television program distribution is still unmet not only in the Federal 
[Germany but elsewhere in Europe. Yet, with the availability of video re- 
time shifting and film rends it is not at all clear how much of a driving 
m g e  consumer demand will be. Uncertainty reigns as to how much con- 
I be willing to pay for how many satellite delivered alternative programs. 
A States it has already become clear that a potential choice of thuty plus 
practice boils down to about seven to nine actual program options which 
ly sampled by a television household. These as we have seen are already 
many German viewers. It is further evident that subscriptions depend on 
ered in the basic cable service. The provision of entertainment alone is 
~t a very secure basis for communication modernization. 
more long-term promise of change seems to lie in the telematics field and 
broad-band cable and interactive data system development for business, 
i ultimately the home. Here DBS satellites may become the preferred trans- 
de  for individual countries (Taishoff, 1987). In Europe governments are 
:tive players involved in these developments. The German government has 
: subsidized private research and development expenses since the fifties in 
~munications field. The K and K Telecommunications Report (1976) fur- 
~pported the continued extension of the telephone network and was probab- 
onsible for the shift from DBS to cable expansion in the eighties. Since 
man PTT, which claims to be the largest nonmilitary investor in videotex 
mns of telematics has also pushed for more rapid development of fibre op- 
nvolved with high-resolution TV experiments on DBS channels. 
shift which is evident in Germany and elsewhere is a transition from cul- 
lstry policy goals. But this does not imply a rush to "deregulation" in the 
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U.S. sense of privatization. The German response to the EEC's proposal Television 
without Frontiers has shown that broadcast regulation in Europe is viewed as a 
prerogative of national governments and that these are loath to give up their powers. 
In Germany regulation is practiced by the broadcast media themselves based on con- 
stitutional and Laender guidelines. While there is some extension of commercializa- 
tion in relation to local radio and cable systems, these commercial players will have 
to live up to the same set of guidelines as the public service broadcasters conceming 
the provision of a balanced program of information and entertainment Consequent- 
ly the development of new media regulation, while it paves the way for a mixed 
publicfprivate electronic system, will do so by exfending the existing regulatory 
framework, rather than by innovating a whole set of new rules. In Germany this means 
a continued separation of control over hardware (technological standards of the net- 
work) in the hands of the P'lT and content control located in the eleven Laender 
governments. As yet these governments with conservative and social democratic party 
affiliations have not agreed on a common (federation wide) media policy concerning 
private suppliers, advertising standards, and other contentious issues. Only six of the 
eleven Laender have at present worked out broadcast regulations concerning private 
participation (Roeper, l987a: 35). 
Challenges to the Public Service Ethic 
Another shift which is becoming visible concerns the role of public broadcasters 
in Germany and in Europe's electronic future (Ferguson, 1986). Where they enjoyed 
an uncontested monopoly in the production and supply of broadcast content on the 
traditional network, their capacities today are insufficient to fill the extra numbers of 
channels now available through satellite and cable technologies. The creation of new 
European TV programming, the EBU demonstrated, is constrained not by nutional 
but by linguistic borders. Network television produc tion in Europe's five top languages 
must therefore be combined with increased regional cooperative agreements in order 
to achieve savings in scale. These savings will however accrue primarily to English 
language material, because it has a larger world market and is the lingua franca of 
science, trade and communications (Wedell, 198550). The fear of "Americanization" 
is therefore real not only on the side of European production needs, but also on that of 
distribution. In the three most populous countries broadcasters are trying to export 
their programming to linguistically similar neighbors (Austria, Switzerland) the Ger- 
man example has shown. 
In the light of these findings, the EBU argues that program "variety" and the solu- 
tion to the public-private dilemma, in the European situation requires that public ser- 
vice criteria be applied to all programmers equally. Only if every channel has defined 
and complementary program goals will the inevitable erosion of national public ser- 
vice monopolies and networks be halted (Scharf, 1985b:70-71). This erosion will 
however be much slower than the private developers of cable and DBS satellites have 
expected. The German debate has shown that the high costs of European network trans- 
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d the low returns from national markets will produce no fundamental change 
ent structure of broadcasting until the year 2000. Private producers, all the 
uggests, will require at least twelve years to consolidate their status and to 
how many channels will be economically feasible in the long run. 
m's satellite debate furthermore suggests that the erosion of national broad- 
plies will not result from outside competition, but rather from competition 
system itself, generated by the codprice squeeze. It is already known that 
lf producing a "balanced" program schedule are much higher than those for 
lent programming. The latter, German studies show, consist mainly of quiz- 
s, and films, all of which can be bought for a fraction of their original produc- 
Krueger, 1985:266-7). The combination of rising program expenses, with 
nbers of viewers because of private competition, will make it increasingly 
I justify higher license fees for public service programming. 
'reen Book proposes to halt the internal erosion through European coproduc- 
lures, a common satellite channel and film subsidies. Although such 
according to the Manchester Institute, will slow the decline of public broad- 
Europe, they will not ultimately eliminate it (Wedell, 198561-2). Scholar- 
nada and elsewhere suggests that without a fundamental reevaluation of its 
-ole, the balance between public service and private (entertainment) criteria 
lped in favor of the latter. 
The C 
unfortunat 
has failed 
financial b 
separation 
for a total l 
incursion. 
quality wil 
broadcast€ 
achieved a 
is howevei 
fore suppc 
not. The zu 
of advertif 
devoted to 
ierman discussion over the new mixed publiclprivate broadcasting law has 
ely focused on political and institutional, rather than on social issues and 
to ask for input from the public . Both political parties agree that a secure 
lase for a mixed public/private broadcast system requires continued judicial 
of print and broadcast regulation. Consensus also reigns on the necessity 
ban on cross-ownership in local markets to protect the press from electronic 
Agreement furthermore exists in principle that the maintenance of program 
I1 require that private broadcasters be subject to the same criteria as the public 
:rs (Starnmler, 1985611-13). On the means of whereby this goal is to be 
md on the thorny issue of advertising quotas, agreement between the parties 
r lacking. The reigning CDU Laender are in favor of privatization and there- 
m-t the liberalization of advertising statutes, while the SPD run Laender do 
mount of income to be derived from advertising, as well as the total amount 
;ing per hour (12 min.) and the quantity of total daily program time to be 
I ads (10-20%). are still undecided. 
The n 
Hoffman-] 
legal defin 
content, ac 
and equali 
leans for ensuring program quality also remain controversial. Experts like 
Riem argue that the requirement of "program variety" needs an expanded 
lition beyond the one presently in existence. Four types of pluralism, (genre, 
:cess and geographical) were proposed by him to assure content diversity 
ize the economic chances of different program genres in the international 
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market (Hoffman-Riem, 1985182-5). Such criteria would serve to stem the tide of 
program homogenization already evident in Europe's private channels (Krueger, 
1988:lOl). Others agitate for content quotas, which were however rejected by the 
Deutscher Kulturrat in 1984, on the grounds that they set a dangerous political prece- 
dent. Their recommendation cautions that quotas be applied only in conjunction with 
other regulatory measures. The eleven Laender ministers responded to this advice and 
did not include content quotas in their most recent (1986) media law proposals. 
Germany's sketchy institutional proposals in support of a mixed publiclprivate 
broadcasting system reflect a general European malaise: the lack of a public discus- 
sion of the "meaning" of public broadcasting in the satellite age. Instead of respond- 
ing to legitimate public concerns for better access, government bureaucracies seem to 
be aiding the transfer of centralized control to industrial bureaucracies under the guise 
of economic necessity. Public "service" in the sense of independence from political 
and economic interests, remains an altogether vaguely expressed mission of European 
broadcasting systems. Although some references appear to "partnership in the public 
interestl'(Sweden) or "leadership in the public interestW(BBC/United Kingdom), the 
fact remains that in most cases the involvement of the state in broadcasting either 
through its supervisory political position, or through its economic support, has in- 
creased since World War 11. 
Unfortunately the paternalistic models of public broadcasting are particularly 
prone to public revolt and criticism, because they do not provide more than a "for- 
malistic" base for public participation and access. Deep-seated public dissatisfactions 
are consequently utilized by technocrats and private interests as entry points for 
change. In Germany, as we have seen, there have been delibemte and planned PTT in- 
fringements on Laender regulatory competencies, through cable network planning and 
equipment standard setting. There has also been ministerial resistance to license fee 
increases, in spite of rising production costs and a steady politization of the two 
public network's governing councils by party officials (Roeper, 1987a:35). 
Taken together these trends add up to increased centralization of power in media 
bureaucracies or private media "multis" rather than genuine "public" conml over 
media programming. Together this "doppel Monopol" will make the German broad- 
casting system less and less responsive to its audiences. Put another way, Germany's 
public broadcast services are increasingly organized for but not in response to the com- 
municative needs of its citizens. Existing technocratically dominated patterns of or- 
ganization in the information/communication sector make large-scale public 
involvement nearly impossible and thus frustrate the communicative competence of 
individuals and groups in the political communication process (Hardt, 1985:ll-13). 
How to remedy this situation and move toward a more democratic system of 
public communication is at the heart of the public broadcasting debate in Empe. Plan- 
ning for such an alternative would require the creation of novel conditions for group 
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 pat ion in the social communication process. Canada's 1974 "Challenge for 
:em project was one such attempt. It set up interactive cable networks with which 
rough which individuals and groups could communicate with each other at dif- 
social levels (Gwyn, 1983). The local radio movement in France (now largely 
d) and Britain's Channel 4, with its programming from independent producers, 
ier attempts at making access to electronic communication available to different 
groups. In spite of these initiatives, European and North American democracies 
however, generally failed to establish new conditions for public involvement in 
cial communication process. 
uch conditions are not created by merely expanding the public's role as con- 
s of political or economic products, or by making media available to limited 
They grow out of exchanges of experience, language and culture at all levels of 
y. To reconceptualize public broadcasting by and for the people, social com- 
ation must be viewed as a vital human activity, in which distribution tech- 
les play only an instrumental role. Unfortunately the public debate about the 
I uses to which technologies are to be put has been sidestepped in the present 
em wrangle over commercialization. The drift towards profitaiented media 
~tives is, as we have seen, not inevitable. It is the result of specific political and 
mic decisions which respond to technological rather than to social needs. In the 
onditions public service broadcasting systems will have to rethink their social 
In, both to their home and their European audiences. 
Lessons for Canadian Policy Makers? 
he German case study in particular and European policy initiatives in general 
te that new media are innovated into a preexisting national socio-political con- 
[n this context, industrial interests are only one among a group of players with 
t o  define and determine new media policy. Even within the electronics industry, 
ue and hardware interests are not necessarily in harmony. Technological chan- 
asequently offer opportunities for the realignment of power between different 
groups rather than the automatic ascendancy of industrial interests. In this 
iment of powers, public broadcasters in Germany and their transnational 
rative EBU organization have suffered a decrease of influence. Social and cul- 
lites who have fostered national production in film, theatre and broadcasting, 
,150 had their power diminished in spite of receiving assistance from such new- 
s as private multinational producers. The local F T l 3  in contrast and such inter- 
al actors as the EEC seem to be playing a more active role in policy making than 
. Their salience has increased either because they have become the instruments 
~onal electronic policy or as independent actors in semi-commercial undertak- 
lesigned to overcome the EEC's lag in telecommunications (Dewandre, 
41). 
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Because of their national focus European interpretations of the technological fu- 
ture have not fostered a coherent policy for their own region. The national aims of 
countries like Germany are furthermore only in partial harmony with other national 
players like France or the European Community which is proposing to eliminate 
economic barriers by 1992. The national focus of Europe's new media policies makes 
it difficult for Canadian policy makers to utilize insights from "abroad because they 
are predicated on a very different set of economic and political preconditions. 
In spite of this our discussion has indicated that there is a common resonance to 
at least two issues: commercialization and democratization of access. The Canadian 
Conservative government like those of Germany and Great Britain seems to have 
hitched a portion of its electronic medii distribution future to private initiative. Yet 
the forms that these initiatives can take, our discussion has shown, differ substantial- 
ly here and abroad. Great Britain seems to have been most successful in creating a 
balance between private and public financing coupled with quality and variety in 
television production. Canada's administered regime operated through the CRTC has 
in contrast been considered a failure by the 1987 Caplan-Sauvageau report. It showed 
that here is clearly a limit beyond which a commitment to market allocations is incom- 
patible with a distinctly Canadian broadcast system. But there is also a good deal of 
evidence that the absence of market pressures has not served the Canadian public well 
(Collins, 1986: 159). 
In spite of an extensive history of innovative proposals, "democratization of ac- 
cess" is moving forward only at a snail's pace both in Canada and abroad. Socially 
engaged interest groups like civic organizations, women's and native groups, peace 
organizations and associations for the elderly have demanded changes from Canadian 
state elites, broadcast bureaucrats and commercial broadcasters. Useful proposals 
have included program production decentralization through "bottom-up" program pro- 
cedures, aimed at providing a more diversified national CBC schedule. In addition 
there have been initiatives to develop autonomous "community media" located be- 
tween the public and private sectors to open up pathways for citizen expression and 
feedback on purely local issues. Quebec's 37 community TV channels and two dozen 
community radio stations, as well as the Innuit Broadcasting Corporation (1981) are 
living examples of citizen access and program production which are not state produced 
(Raboy, 1986:25). The allocation of cable licenses to viewer-owned cooperatives for 
redistribution of their own program mix, is yet another pathway to broadcast 
democratization (Raboy, 1986:29-30). 
In the light of the European debate and Canadian evidence Marc Raboy 's sugges- 
tion that the survival of public broadcasting in a "mixed system" is dependent here and 
abroad on the extent to which a space can be created for socially justified autonomous 
media, regardless of their economic viability and their political expediency. In order 
to increase the emancipatory potential of public broadcasting, bureaucratic structures 
need to be opened to direct citizen participation in every stage of policy formation, 
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regulation and program production. As consumen, people in the twentieth century 
need to receive a balanced program schedule into which they have had input on the 
local and national programming levels. As communicating citizens, they additional- 
ly require access to broadcast means, which will help to transform the "etatist" struc- 
tures and program centralization which unfortunately characterize public broadcast 
structures all over the world (Raboy, 1986:39-40). 
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